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The 1990 Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law: An
Analysis of "Bad Faith" and the "Limited Tort
Option"
House Bill 121 imposed mandatory rollbacks in automobile in-
surance premiums ranging anywhere from ten to twenty-two per-
cent, depending on the coverage which is chosen. These cutbacks
have a direct effect upon consumers purchasing insurance policies
and inurance companies as well. Because of these changes, the
1990 Pennsylvania auto insurance law has been getting headlines
in the news.
CONSUMERS COULD BE SAVING MORE ON AUTO
INSURANCE, CASEY SAYS.1
STATE FARM STOPS WRITING POLICIES FOR
NEW CLIENTS.2
Governor Casey today said insurance companies, their agents and others
with vested interests in seeing the state's new auto insurance law fail are
not giving consumers enough help in making choices that will save them
money.
'But to make the most of their options, people have to know their rights,
and that's an area where insurance companies and agents simply haven't
been doing a good enough job,' Casey said.'
As illustrated by the newspaper clippings above, House Bill 121
has generated a great deal of attention and debate. Perhaps the
two most important aspects of House Bill 121 involve the creation
of first party "bad faith" and the- inclusion of a "limited tort op-
tion.." Part One of this article will attempt to point out the signifi-
cance of the introduction of first party "bad faith" into Pennsylva-
nia insurance law, and, more importantly, to.define "bad faith" for
purposes of insurance recovery. Part Two will attempt to clarify
some of the confusion raised in the past few months with regard to
the new "limited tort option."
1. The Pittsburgh Press, B10 (Wednesday, October 3, 1990).
2. The Pittsburgh Press, B6 (Friday, September 14, 1990).
3. Consumers Could Be Saving More On Auto Insurance, Casey Says, The Pittsburgh
Press, B10 (Wednesday, October 3, 1990).
The Pennsylvania Issue
I. FIRST PARTY "BAD FAITH"
Perhaps the most controversial, as well as complicated, section
of House Bill 121 is found in section 3, which contains amend-
ments to Chapter 83 of Title 42. Section 8371 is entitled "Actions
on insurance policies" and reads:
In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the
insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of
the following actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim
was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of
interest plus 3%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer.'
A. Sub-Issues To Section 8371
There are several underlying issues concerning section 8371 that
must be addressed before an in depth examination of the statute's
effects can be *performed.
1. Scope of Section 8371
The first issue concerns the scope of section 8371. The title of
the section is "Actions on insurance policies." Therefore, although
this section is included within changes to the Pennsylvania auto-
mobile insurance laws, it would appear to affect actions on any
type of insurance policy.5 This interpretation is further supported
by the language within the statute which states, "[in an action
arising under an insurance policy. . ." The language does not spe-
cifically target automobile insurance; instead, the section provides
a more general scope.
2. The Impact of the Effective Date of Section 8371
Questions will also arise as to the impact of the effective date of
the statute, which was July 1, 1990.6 As a general provision, "[n]o
4. Act 1990-6, HB No 121, 2 Pa Legis Serv 8 (Purdon March 1990), codified at 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 8371 (Purdon 1990).
5. John Patrick Lydon, The New First-Party Bad Faith Statute, Insurance Bad Faith
JPL-1 (Trial Advocacy Foundation of Pennsylvania of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers As-
sociation 1990). Mr. Lydon notes that section 8371 will apply to any insurance policy
whether the risk covered is motor vehicle, fire, property, professional negligence, disability,
homeowners, business, life or any other insurance.
6. Section 32(8) of House Bill 121 notes that the "act shall take effect July 1, 1990."
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statute shall [be] construed to be retroactive unless clearly and
manifestly so intended by the General Assembly."'7 As section 8371
does not provide retroactivity, it will be difficult to argue that the
statute should apply to controversies where the insurance action
was commenced and the alleged bad faith occurred prior to the
July 1, 1990 deadline.
On the other hand, it seems logical that if either the insurance
action was commenced or the bad faith occurred after the July 1
deadline, then an action based upon section 8371 is possible. The
statute is composed of two essential elements." The first element is
"an action arising under an insurance policy," in other words, the
commencement of an insurance action.9 The second element is met
when a plaintiff can show that "the insurer has acted in bad faith
toward the insured."10 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Ludmer v Nernberg" and Gehris v Commw of Pennsylvania,
Dept. of Transp.12 held that "the fact that some of the require-
ments for application of a statute occur prior to the enactment of
the statute, does not result in the retroactive application of that
statute."1 8 Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer that the
courts will adhere to their prior practice witnessed in Ludmer and
Gehris, and apply section 8371 if either of its two elements oc-
curred after the July 1, 1990 date.
Obviously, if both elements of section 8371 occur after July 1,
1990, then the statute will apply.
3. Definition of "Action" Within Section 8371
Interpretation of the new law might also raise questions as to the
meaning of the word "action" found within the language of section
8371. As a general provision, the word "action" is defined as,
"[a]ny suit or proceeding in any court of this Commonwealth.""' It
would seem, therefore, that any civil lawsuit resting its claim upon
an insurance action would fall within the scope of the statute. 5
Act 1990.6 (cited in note 4).
7. 1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1926 (Purdon 1972).
8. Lydon, The New First-Party Bad Faith at JPL-1-2 (cited in note 5).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 520 Pa 238, 553 A2d 924 (1989).
12. 471 Pa 210, 369 A2d 1271 (1977).
13. Ludmer, 553 A2d at 926 (quoting Gehris v Commw of Pennsylvania, Dept. of
Transp., 471 Pa 210, 369 A2d 1271 (1977)).
14. 1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1991 (Purdon 1984).
15. Lydon, The New First-Party Bad Faith at JPL-2 (cited in note 5).
1991
The Pennsylvania Issue
The more complicated issues regarding the meaning of the word
"action" may surround arbitration actions, and whether or not
they fall within the realm of section 8371. It is illogical to assert
that the General Assembly did not intend "action" to encompass
arbitration proceedings, while at the same time the term would in-
clude civil proceedings.16 This is especially true considering the
fact that many arbitration actions involve issues which civil tribu-
nals have jurisdiction over and are, therefore, called upon to re-
solve.17 Finally, it would be an unreasonable interpretation of the
statute for courts to exclude arbitration actions from the applica-
tion of section 8371 considering their value and widespread use in
Pennsylvania's legal system for the settlement of disputes in insur-
ance actions.
4. Meaning of "Court" Within Section 8371
The final underlying issue which must be addressed before a
more in depth analysis of section 8371 may be undertaken con-
cerns the meaning of the word "court" found within the language
of the statute. The word is defined as "any one or more of the
judges of the court who are authorized by general rule or rule of
court . .. 18 Therefore, it appears that the party designated by the
General Assembly to determine if "bad faith" has occurred and,
accordingly, to award the appropriate damages is the judge presid-
ing over the action.19 This point is of vital importance, especially
when the focus is turned to the following two particular legal
premises, both of which deal with subsection (2) of section 8371
(punitive damages). First, when a factfinder is burdened with the
task of determining punitive damages, he is entitled to hear evi-
dence as to the net worth of the insurer.20 Second, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recently held that the amount of punitive
damages awarded need not bear any reasonable relation to the
amount of compensatory damages awarded. 21 Thus, to first allow a
16. Lydon, The New First-Party Bad Faith JPL-3 (cited in note 5).
17. See 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7304 (Purdon 1980) (court proceedings to compel or
stay arbitration); 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7305 (Purdon 1980) (appointment of arbitrators by
court); 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7313 (Purdon 1980) (confirmation of award by court); 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 7314 (Purdon 1980) (vacating of an award'by the court).
18. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 102 (Purdon 1980).
19. James R. Ronca, Detailed Outline of 1990 Motor Vehicle Insurance Amendments,
8 Pa Auto Insurance Law 3 (Trial Advocacy Foundation of Pennsylvania of the Pennsylva-
nia Trial Lawyers Association 1990).
20. Feld v Merriam, 506 Pa 383, 485 A2d 742 (1984):
21. Kirkbride v Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa 97, 555 A2d 800 (1989).
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jury to hear evidence of an insurance company's net worth and
then ask them to aWard punitive damages which do not necessarily
have to bear any relation to actual damages has dangerous pos-
sibilities; such an approach could not have been intended by the
General Assembly.
B. "Bad Faith" Within Section 8371
Section 8371 gives a court the discretion to grant interest, puni-
tive damages, court costs, and attorney's .fees to any party who
brings an action under an insurance policy, if that party can show
"bad faith" on the part of the insurer.2" Therefore, the obvious is-
sue surrounding section 8371 will concern the meaning of the term
"bad faith." Unfortunately, section 8371 fails to provide a defini-
tion for "bad faith." Furthermore, there are no current decisions
interpreting the meaning of section 8371's "bad faith," nor any
other state in the country with a similar statute to provide some
guidance. Accordingly, to achieve a better understanding of how
the Pennsylvania courts will inteipret section 8371, an analysis of
the history of first party "bad faith" actions is helpful.
1. History of First Party "Bad Faith"
a. California's creation and Wisconsin's development
In the past two decades, this country's jurisdictions have been
exposed to an increasing number of cases involving an action
against an insurer for first party bad faith. 3 The first party "bad
faith" action has undoubtedly been one of the more controversial
tort issues throughout the states. These actions most commonly
arise when the insurer is accused of wrongful refusal to pay, wrong-
ful delay in payment, or unconscionable methods in investigating
or adjusting losses of an insured.
As one might guess, the first state to recognize first party actions
for "bad faith" on the part of an insurer was California. The
ground breaking case on this issue was Gruenberg v Aetna Insur-
ance Company."
In Gruenberg, the plaintiff, Jerome Gruenberg, was the owner of
22. See note 4 and accompanying text.
23. For the sake of clarity, "first party bad faith" occurs in situations where an in-
sured files an insurance claim with his insurer and the insurer refuses to settle that claim
using good faith. "Third party bad faith" occurs where the insurer represents its insured in
bad faith in the settlement of a claim between the insured and a third party.
24. 108 Cal Rptr 480, 510 P2d 1032 (1973).
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a cocktail lounge and restaurant business in Los Angeles known as
the Brass Rail.25 The premises were insured against fire loss in the
aggregate sum of $35,000.00.26 On November 9, 1969, a fire oc-
curred at the Brass Rail and the establishment was destroyed. Sev-
eral days later, on November 13, 1969, the plaintiff was charged in
a felony complaint with the crimes of arson and defrauding an
insurer.
In the meantime, the defendant insurance companies retained a
law firm to represent them in the matter of plaintiff's claim of loss.
The defendants' law firm issued a letter dated November 25, 1969,
demanding that plaintiff appear at their law offices on December
12, 1969, to submit to an examination under oath as was required
by the insurance contract. The plaintiff's attorney responded to
the letter by requesting that the defendants waive the requirement
of the examination of the plaintiff until the plaintiff's criminal dif-
ficulties were extinguished.27 The law firm representing the defend-
ants refused the plaintiff's request. On December 16, 1969, the de-
fendant insurance companies denied liability under their insurance
policies because of the plaintiff's failure to submit to the
examination. 8
On January 12, 1970 the criminal charges brought against the
plaintiff alleging arson were dropped for lack of probable cause. In
response to this event, the plaintiff's attorney advised defendant
insurers on January 26, 1970 that the plaintiff wfs now prepared to
submit himself for the examination.29 However, the insurers reiter-
ated their position that they were refusing liability because the
plaintiff failed to appear for the examination at the requisite time.
In response to the insurers' actions, the plaintiff filed a one
count complaint alleging that the defendant insurers breached
their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.30 The plaintiff
alleged that, as a result of the "outrageous conduct and bad faith
of the defendants," he suffered "severe economic damage," "severe
emotional upset and distress," loss of earnings and various special
damages.31 Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive
damages.
25. Gruenberg, 510 P2d at 1034.
26. Id.
27. Id at 1035.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id at 1036.
31. Id at 1035.
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The defendant insurers filed general demurrers to the complaint,
which demurrers were sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff
elected to stand on his complaint, and an order of dismissal was
entered.32 An appeal to the Supreme Court of California followed.
In determining whether the plaintiff had stated facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, the supreme court referred to third
party "bad faith" insurance actions and noted that violating the
insurance contract's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
was tortious conduct. The court stated, "There is an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract [including in-
surance policies] that neither party will do anything which will in-
jure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement." 3 The court instructed that this duty was not one
which is mandated by the terms of the policy, but instead, is an
obligation imposed by law."' The court then applied this logic to
first party insurance actions, thereby establishing a new cause of
action. In doing so, the court noted that there is no difference be-
tween the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by in-
surers in third party cases and the duty owed by insurers in first
party cases. "These are merely two different aspects of the same
duty."
In establishing a cause of action for first party "bad faith," the
Gruenberg court held that economic losses, as well as damages for
"mental distress," could be recovered." In permitting the plaintiff
to recover such damages, the court followed its earlier decisions in
the third party cases, as well as California's general rules of dam-
ages in tort.
37
Note that in this landmark case the Gruenberg court never de-
fined or established elements for the first party "bad faith" tort.
Five years after the Gruenberg decision, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, in Anderson v Continental Insurance Company,38 fol-
lowed California's lead and also adopted the tort of first party
"bad faith." In so doing, the Wisconsin court clarified, expanded
and firmly established this new tort for the entire nation.
32. Id at 1036.
33. Id (quoting Communale v Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal2d 654, 328 P2d 198
(1950)).
34. Gruenberg, 510 P2d at 1037:
35. Id.
36. Id at 1040-42.
37. Id at 1041.
38. 85 Wis 2d 675. 271 NW2d 368 (1978).
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The Anderson court was less bashful than the Gruenberg court
in explicitly separating the tort and contract aspects of a first
party "bad faith" action. As the court stated, "[b]y virtue of the
relationship between the parties created by the contract, a special
duty arises, the breach of which duty is a tort and is unrelated to
contract damages."3 9 The court took special pains to separate any
hint of contract from the first party "bad faith" tort. The court
noted:
We emphasize at this juncture only that the tort of bad faith is not a
tortious breach of contract. It is a separate intentional wrong, which results
from a breach of duty imposed as. a consequence of the relationship estab-
lished by contract.
40
Through this holding, the Anderson court left no doubt that "bad
faith" conduct of an insurer in first party negotiations was an in-
tentional tort in and of itself.
Most importantly, the court set out an objective test for deter-
mining when compensable "bad faith" on the part of the insurer
has occurred. According to the court,
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant's
knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying
the claim. It is apparent, then, that the tort of bad faith is an intentional
one. "Bad faith" by definition cannot be unintentional. "Bad faith" is de-
fined as "Deceit; duplicity; insincerity."'"
Another area of importance which the Anderson court ad-
dressed, unlike the Gruenberg court, is the issue of whether puni-
tive damages may be awarded in first party "bad faith" actions.
Again, the court took great care in articulating a clear ruling. The
Anderson court stated:
We do not conclude, however, that the proof of a bad faith cause of action
necessarily makes punitive damages appropriate. Punitive damages are
awarded to punish a wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent. Mid-Continent
Refrigerator Co. v Straka, 47 Wis2d 739, 178 NW2d 28 (1970). We pointed
out in Mid-Continent that punitive damages are to be awarded "only where
the wrong was inflicted 'under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cru-
elty, with vindictiveness or malice.'" Id. at 32.42
The importance of the Anderson decision must be recognized.
39. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 374.
40. Id.
41. Id at 376 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 471
(1969)).
42. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 379.
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Although the Gruenberg court started the ball rolling on this par-
ticular issue, the Anderson court took the bull by the horns, so to
speak. The Anderson decision clarified any gray areas apparent in
California's first party "bad faith." law; most importantly, the court
specifically defined "bad faith" and established the requisite ele-
ments of the test. After this decision, state jurisdictions were pro-
vided with a succinct statement of what constitutes "bad faith."
Accordingly, states wasted little time in adopting the first party
"bad faith" tort.
b. Other states respond
In the years following the advent of the first party "bad faith"
tort, many states followed the logic and language of the Gruenberg
and Anderson decisions.43 Colorado even expounded upon the An-
derson definition of "bad faith." Other states embarked upon their
own course in dealing with the first party "bad faith" tort. Some of
these states formed their own definition or objective standards for
"bad faith." North Carolina developed a contract/tort hybrid for-
first party "bad faith" situations Which was quite distinct from the
GruenbergiAnderson tort. Others, such as Pennsylvania, explicitly
denied the existence of a first party "bad faith" tort.
The Supreme Court of Colorado directly adopted the language
and reasoning of the Anderson decision in Travelers Insurance
Company v Savio.4 In doing so, the Travelers court interpreted
the two elements of the objective standard set forth in Anderson."
The first element of the Anderson test, unreasonable conduct,
"[would] be determined on an objective basis, requiring proof of
the standards of conduct in the industry. 4' The second element of
the Anderson test, reckless disregard that the conduct is unreason-
able, was analyzed by the court as follows:
The second element of the test reflects a reasonable balance between the
right of an insurance carrier to reject a non-compensable claim submitted
43. See Travelers Ins. Co. v Savio, 706 P2d 1258 (Colo 1985); White v Unigard Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P2d 1014 (1986); Weems v American Security Ins. Co., 486
So2d 1222 (Miss 1986); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279
NW2d 638 (ND 1979); Hoskins v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St 3d 272, 452 NE2d 1315
(1983); Bibeault v Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A2d 313 (RI 1980); Matter of Certification of a
Question of Law from the U.S. District Court, District of South Dakota, Western Division,
399 NW2d 320 (SD 1987); McCullough v Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P2d 855 (Wyo 1990).
The McCullough court provides an excellent state-by-state synopsis of "bad faith" in its
many different forms. McCullough, 789 P2d at 857, nn.5-7.
44. 706 P2d 1258 (Colo 1985).
45. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 376. See also, note 39 and accompanying text.
46. Travelers, 706 P2d at 1275.
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by its insured and the obligation of such carrier- to investigate and ulti-
mately approve a valid claim of its insured. If an insurer does not know that-
its denial of or delay in processing a claim filed by its insured is unreasona-
ble, and does not act with reckless disregard of a valid claim, the insurer's
conduct would be based upon a permissible, albeit mistaken, belief that the
claim is not compensable.'
7
As noted previously, several states adopted the tort of first party
"bad faith," but established their own definition or objective stan-
dards for "bad faith." For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in
Hoskins v Aetna Life Insurance Company,4" adopted a definition
of "bad faith" which was different from the two element Anderson
test. The Hoskins court elaborated upon the concept of lack of
good faith:
A lack of good faith is the equivalent of bad faith, and bad faith, although
not susceptible of concrete definition, embraces more than bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious
wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will
partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead
or deceive another.
4
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in King v National Foundation
Life Insurance Company,50 held that the appropriate test for de-
termining bad faith was the objective standard of whether the va-
lidity of the denied claim was not "fairly arguable." As the King
court noted, "If any one of the reasons for denial of coverage is at
least 'arguable,' this Court need not look any further." 51 Although
it appears that the King court made a departure from the Ander-
son court's "fairly debatable" standard, it is not clear what differ-
ence there is between these two objective standards. One court has
implied, through its interchangeable use of the two objective stan-
dards, that there is no difference whatsoever. 52
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in Dailey v Integon
General Insurance Corporation,5 3 also developed a solution to sit-
47. Id.
48. 6 Ohio St 3d 272, 452 NE2d 1315 (1983).
49. Hoskins, 452 NE2d at 1320 (quoting Slater v Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 174 Ohio
St 148, 187 NE2d 45 (1965)).
50. 541 So2d 502 (Ala 1989).
51. King, 541 So2d at 505 (quoting McLaughlin v Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual
Casualty Ins. Co., 437 So2d 86, 91 (Ala 1983)). The "fairly arguable" standard is a depar-
ture from the "fairly debatable" objective standard found within the Anderson decision.
Anderson, 271 NW2d at 376-77.
52. See McCullough v Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P2d 855, 860 (Wyo 1990).
53. 75 NC App 387, 331 SE2d 148 (1985). The Dailey decision was the culmination of
a series of North Carolina appellate court decisions which dealt with this area of the law.
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uations where there is "bad faith" on the part of the insurer to its
insured. The North Carolina solution, however, is different from
the first party "bad faith" tort. Unlike the Gruenberg and Ander-
son courts which invented a special tort for these situations, the
Dailey court formed a hybrid contract/tort action. Traditionally,
an insured would avail himself of any improprieties by the insurer
through a breach of contract action. Unfortunately, the traditional
law of contracts disallowed punitive damages in breach of contract
actions. 4 Through the Dailey court's new hybrid cause of action,
the insured could now recover compensatory damages through a
breach of contract action, while recovering punitive damages for
the insurer's "bad faith" given the tort overtones of such conduct.
The Dailey court explained that, "where there is an identifiable
tort even though the tort also constitutes, or accompanies, a breach
of contract, the tort may itself give rise to a claim for punitive
damages. ' 55 The court added, "Even when sufficient facts are al-
leged to make out an identifiable tort, however, the tortious con-
duct must be accompanied by or partake of some element of aggra-
vation before punitive damages will be allowed."56 The Dailey
court then noted that "aggravated conduct" is defined to include,
"fraud, malice, gross negligence, insult, . . . wilfully, or under cir-
cumstances of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner which
evinces a reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights."5
Apparently, the North Carolina courts have managed to give the
insured a weapon to prevent "bad faith" on the part of the insur-
ers, while not offending traditional contract law or requiring the
invention of a new tort.
Taking yet another approach, the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia explicitly denied the existence of the tort of first party "bad
faith" in D'Ambrosio v Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty
Insurance Company.58 In so doing, the D'Ambrosio court rejected
the Gruenberg decision and the tort created by its holding."
In D'Ambrosio the plaintiff, Anthony D'Ambrosio, commenced
See also, Stanback v Stanback, 297 NC 181, 254 SE2d 611 (1979); Payne v N.C. Farm
Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 67 NC App 692, 313 SE2d 912 (1984); Dailey v Integon, 57 NC
App 346, 291 SE2d 331 (1982).
54. King v Ins. Co. of North America, 273 NC 396, 159 SE2d 891 (1968).
55. Dailey, 331 SE2d at 153-54 (quoting Newton v Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 NC
105, 111, 229 SE2d 297, 301 (1976)).
56. Dailey, 331 SE2d at 154 (quoting Newton, 229 SE2d at 301).
57. Id (quoting Baker v Winslow, 184 NC 1, 5, 113 SE2d 570, 572 (1922)).
58. 494 Pa 501, 431 A2d 966 (1981).
59. D'Ambrosio, 431 A2d at 968-70.
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the action by filing a two-count complaint, one in assumpsit and
the second in trespass.6 0 In the plaintiff's count in assumpsit, he
alleged that his motor boat, which was covered by the defendant
insurance company, was damaged in a severe storm. The plaintiff
claimed the defendant breached the insurance contract by not
honoring the claim relating to the damages to the plaintiff's boat.
In the plaintiff's count in trespass, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant "summarily denied" the plaintiff's claim for the dam-
ages to his boat. Based on this alleged "bad faith" conduct, the
plaintiff sought compensatory damages in an amount in excess of
$10,000 and punitive damages in an amount in excess of $10,000,
plus all costs and attorney's fees.8 1
The defendant filed preliminary objections to the count in tres-
pass, in the nature of a demurrer. The preliminary objections were
sustained and the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County dis-
missed the count in trespass. After the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed the trial court decision, the supreme court granted
an allowance of appeal.
The D'Ambrosio court affirmed the lower court decisions, hold-
ing there was no need to construct a first party "bad faith" tort.
The court stated that such an action was unnecessary because the
"Legislature has already made dramatic, sweeping efforts to curb
the bad faith conduct. ' '62 The court concluded by stating:
Surely it is for the Legislature to announce and implement the Common-
wealth's public policy governing the regulation of insurance carriers. In our
view, it is equally for the Legislature to determine whether sanctions be-
yond those created under the Act [Unfair Insurance Practices Act] are re-
quired to deter conduct which is less than scrupulous. 8
2. Possible Definitions of Pennsylvania's Section 8371 "Bad
Faith"
The D'Ambrosio court explained that it was beyond the scope of
their responsibilities to implement laws which are matters of pub-
lic policy. The court reasoned that if the legislature believed the
60. Id at 967.
61. Id at 968.
62. Id at 969. These dramatic, sweeping efforts can be located within the Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act, which is found in 40 Pa Stat sections 1171.1 - 1171.15 (Purdon Supp
1990). The court noted that the Unfair Insurance Practices Act contains fifteen "unfair
claim settlement or compromise practices," which are set forth in subsection (10) of 40 Pa
Stat section 1171.5. D'Ambrosio, 431 A2d at 969.
63. Id at 970.
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insurance industry required a deterrent to safeguard the interests
of the insured, then the legislature should establish standards to
provide this protection. Therefore, one can infer that the legisla-
ture enacted section 8371 to provide this protection. Unfortu-
nately, the statute is not specific enough to determine how strin-
gently this protection should be applied. To determine the
parameters of section 8371, the definition of "bad faith" must be
ascertained.
One commentator has suggested that the search for the defini-
tion of "bad faith" should start with the third party "bad faith"
cases in Pennsylvania.4 An examination of these third party cases
reveals that "an insured may recover from his insurer, regardless of
policy limitations, on the ground of negligence, bad faith, or fraud
in the insurer's conduct in respect of its responsibility."6 5 A recent
Superior Court of Pennsylvania decision noted that a decision not
to settle "must be a thoroughly honest, intelligent and objective
one." 6 These are low standards which are not difficult ones for an
insured plaintiff to meet. The D'Ambrosio court rejected the objec-
tive standard established by the Gruenberg and Anderson courts.
In order to meet that standard, as was noted in Anderson, the in-
sured plaintiff was required to prove intent on the part of the in-
surer.8 7 Therefore, it is illogical to predict that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania will recognize the third party "bad faith," "negli-
gence" or "honesty" standards given that they fall below the "in-
tent" standard which the court has already rejected.
Other commentators have suggested that certain types of con-
duct giving rise to a claim for section 8371 "bad faith" are set forth
within the standards of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act
(UIPA). 8 Section 1171.5 of the UIPA designates a number of un-
fair or deceptive acts. Section 1171.5(a)(10) may be the most perti-
nent section to this discussion, as it specifies a number of acts
which constitute unfair settlement practices.
There are a number of penalties for violating the standards set
forth in the Unfair Insurance Practices Act. The Insurance Com-
missioner may issue an order requiring the person to cease and de-
64. Lydon, The New First-Party Bad Faith at JPL-5 (cited in note 5).
65. Cowden v Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 389 Pa 459, 134 A2d 223 (1957).
66. See Shearer v Reed, 286 Pa Super 188, 428 A2d 635 (1981).
67. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 374.
68. 40 Pa Stat §§ 1171.1- 1171.15. (Purdon 1974). See Ronca, A Detailed Outline at




sist from engaging in such practices, or, if appropriate, suspend or
revoke the person's license." If an alleged violator fails to comply
with a cease and desist order, the Commissioner may seek an in-
junction in commonwealth court or a court of common pleas of the
county in which the violation occurred.7 0 Finally, civil penalties
may be awarded.7" The maximum of these penalties is a fine of
$5,000.00 for each violation of section 1171.5, and a $10,000.00 fine
for a violation of a cease and desist order.72 An award of punitive
damages may be devastating to an insurer defendant. Obviously,
the possibility exists that these awards will rise above the level of
$50,000.00. 73 Therefore, if a court refers to the Unfair Insurance
Practices Act to determine section 8371 "bad faith," the court is
using standards which, when violated, only provide for penalties of
$5,000 or $10,000 to also determine if punitive damages should be
awarded. This interpretation of section 8371 is untenable.
One commentator suggests that the traditional definitions for
"bad faith," which were developed by the Anderson and
Gruenberg courts and adopted by other states, may be used to de-
termine the meaning of section 8371.71 Under this definition, a
plaintiff pleading an action based on section 8371 would merely be
required to prove that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for de-
nying the benefits of the insured's policy, and that the insurer had
knowledge or reckless disregard of this lack of a reasonable basis."
The idea of Pennsylvania accepting the Gruenberg and Ander-
son definition for "bad faith" fails for several reasons. First, the
Gruenberg decision has already been rejected by the D'Ambrosio
court. Adoption of the Gruenberg decision would mean that sec-
tion 8371 directly overrules the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's
decision in D'Ambrosio. This would be an unintended interpreta-
tion of the statute, as it would cause an effect which does not im-
prove or settle the volatile history of Pennsylvania insurance law.
69. 40 Pa Stat § 1171.9.
70. 40 Pa Stat § 1171.10.
71. 40 Pa Stat § 1171.11.
72. 40 Pa Stat §§ 1171.11(1) and 1171.11(3).
73. The maximum aggregate award of civil penalties available under the Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act is $50,000.00. 40 Pa Stat § 1171.11(1).
74. Edwin L. Scherlis, Punitive Damages in Insurance Policy Litigation: Developing
Trends (First Party), Insurance Bad Faith 6-7 (Trial Advocacy Foundation of Pennsylvania
of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association 1990). Mr. Scherlis suggests this position in
accordance with a strict construction of section 8371. Note, however, that Mr. Scherlis is not
in full support of this position, as it would create two different standards in Pennsylvania
for determining an award of punitive damages.
75. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 374.
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As the statute is contrary to the holdings of the Pennsylvania
courts, the interpretation would further confuse the area of first
party "bad faith." Although it is unlikely that the legislature in-
tended to overrule the D'Ambrosio decision, anything is possible.
Secondly, and more convincingly, if the Pennsylvania courts ap-
ply the Gruenberg and Anderson definition for "bad faith," they
will be applying those landmark decisions incorrectly. The Ander-
son court noted that a plaintiff could receive punitive damages in
first party "bad faith" actions. But to do so, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted with "insult," "cruelty" and "vin-
dictiveness" and not just "bad faith. '7 6 As noted previously, if a
plaintiff who brings an action under section 8371 proves "bad
faith," he may be awarded punitive damages. If the Anderson defi-
nition of "bad faith" is used to prove section 8371 "bad faith,"
then punitive damages will be awarded for "bad faith" in Pennsyl-
vania's courts at a lower standard than in those states that have
actually followed the Anderson decision. This is illogical.
Third, as Mr. Scherlis 77 opined, this interpretation of section
8371 will completely cloud Pennsylvania's laws for the awarding of
punitive damages. Pennsylvania courts have traditionally awarded
punitive damages only "if the conduct was malicious, wanton, reck-
less, willful, or oppressive. "78 If the Anderson definition of "bad
faith" is used to define section 8371 "bad faith," a new exception
will be carved out of this long standing principle. A Pennsylvanian
insured could be awarded punitive damages for proving a standard
which is much lower than "malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or
oppressive" conduct. Clearly, the legislature never intended incon-
sistent standards with respect to punitive damages. Thus, this in-
terpretation is also without merit.
After examining the history of the first party "bad faith" tort
and by looking at several possible interpretations of section 8371,
it is obvious that many of these views are not compatible with the
statute. But, an examination of the history and the interpretations
of section 8371 provides one view of the statute which is, arguably,
the only logical meaning for that section. This view involves two
parts. The first part determines how the statute should be applied.
The second part defines "bad faith."
In construing section 8371 strictly, it is obvious that a "bad
76. Id at 379.
77. See note 74.
78. Rizzo v Haines, 520 Pa 484, 555 A2d 58, 69 (1989) (quoting Chambers V Montgom-
ery, 411 Pa 339, 192 A2d 355, 358 (1963)).
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faith" action under the statute cannot stand alone. The are several
reasons for coming to this conclusion. First, the statute is entitled
"Actions on insurance policies.""9 Section 8371 is not entitled "Ac-
tions for insurer bad faith." The title implies that an action pursu-
ant to section 8371 must be brought in a contract action on the
insurance policy. Second, the language of the statute reads, "[i]n
an action arising under an insurance policy . . ." This language
specifically instructs the insured to bring this action "under" his
action against the insurer on the policy. Third, section 8371 specifi-
cally designates certain forms of damages which are recoverable.
These damages are all exemplary in nature; the statute does not
allow for compensatory damages. This makes sense when one re-
members that the action should be brought with a contract action
on the policy, which, if successful, would provide the appropriate
compensatory damages. Also, it is illogical to assert that the legis-
lature would create a new tort which does not allow the plaintiff to
recover damages for his actual injuries, but instead, only allows
him to recover exemplary damages. Finally, this interpretation
would comport with, and not be contrary to, the D'Ambrosio deci-
sion. The D'Ambrosio court rejected the notion that they should
judicially create the new tort of first party "bad faith." As a "bad
faith" action under section 8371 will not stand on its own, it like-
wise does not fall into the category of torts that the supreme court
rejected.
If section 8371 is given this interpretation it will resemble a tort/
remedy hybrid. A "bad faith" claim based on the statute would be
plead in a complaint as a cause of action in tort; because the tort
cannot stand alone, however, it will merely act as a remedy for ex-
emplary damages. An' action under section 8371, in other words,
looks like a parasite to an action in contract on the insurance
policy.80
79. Act 1990-6 (cited in note 4).
80. Several other states in the country have implemented first party "bad faith" in a
similar fashion. These states, like Pennsylvania, have created a tort for first party situations
but limited its effect so as not to mirror the Gruenberg and Anderson tort. Refer to the
previously discussed North Carolina decision, Dailey v Integon General Ins. Corp., 75 NC
App 387, 331 SE2d 148 (1985), review denied 314.NC 661, 336 SE2d 399. In Dailey the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina developed a contract/tort hybrid. The tort claim, which
had to accompany a contract claim, only allowed punitive damages, while the contract ac-
tion provided compensatory damages.
In Christian v American Home Assurance Co., 577 P2d 899 (Okla 1977), the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma judicially devised a law whose application is quite similar to the applica-
tion of section 8371. In Christian the court held that "an insurer has an implied duty. to
deal fairly and act in good faith with its insured and that the violation of this duty gives rise
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There is one loophole or method for insurers to circumvent this
viewpoint which would frustrate the statute and, therefore, must
be addressed. If an action under section 8371 is parasitic to an ac-
tion on the insurance policy, the "bad faith" action can have its
legs taken out from under it by a settlement of the insurance pol-
icy. For example, a tricky insurer may improperly refuse to settle a
claim and act in "bad faith," but when he is threatened with a
lawsuit based on section 8371, he can settle the policy claim and
end the threat of the "bad faith" suit. Although this appears to be
a serious flaw in this interpretation of section 8371, it may not be
devastating. For example, the Pennsylvania courts could bypass
this problem by simply allowing the insured to reject'a full settle-
ment offer, so that the insured could maintain his action in "bad
faith" against the insurer.81
Section 8371 "bad faith" cannot be defined using the "bad faith"
definition developed in the Anderson decision and its progeny. As
noted previously, if the traditional definition of "bad faith" is used
in conjunction with section 8371, then a new, lower standard for
rewarding punitive damages will'be created. Ultimately, this new
exception, which will be carved out of the current punitive dam-
ages laws in Pennsylvania, will be an incorrect interpretation and
application of the Anderson decision. Logically, the idea of using
the standards from the Unfair Insurance Practices Act or past
Pennsylvania case law dealing with third party "bad faith" actions
must also be dismissed. Therefore, a higher and stricter standard
of "bad faith" must be established so that section 8371 is given its
logical interpretation.
One suggested standard of "bad faith" can be drawn from the
Anderson decision and its progeny in those courts' discussions re-
lating to punitive damages. The Anderson court noted that puni-
tive damages should only be awarded "where the wrong was in-
to an action in tort for which consequential and, in a proper case, punitive, damages may be
sought." Christian, 577 P2d at 904. As can be seen by the Christian holding, the only dam-
ages available under a first party "bad faith" action are exemplary damages. An action in
contract for the consequential damages must accompany the "bad faith" claim.
81. If section 8371 is given this interpretation there will most likely be questions as to
the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations will rest upon whether section 8371 is
treated as a tort or a contract. Any action to recover damages for injuries which is founded
on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortious conduct, or any other action sounding in
trespass, including deceit or fraud, must be commenced within two years. 42 Pa Cons Stat
Ann § 5524(7) (Purdon 1982). An action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded




flicted under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with
vindictiveness or malice. '82 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island
explained:
In regard to punitive damages, we would point out that the intent necessary
to establish the tort of bad faith is not equivalent to the intent that would
sustain an award for punitive damages. Punitive damages may only be
awarded when an insurer has acted with malice, wantonness, or wilfulness.8
Other jurisdictions have likewise addressed the punitive damages
issue. For example, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held, "Al-
though we recognize this tort (bad faith), we believe that the
awarding of punitive damages for the tort of bad faith should re-
main consistent in Wyoming law and require wanton or willful
misconduct. 'a4 The Oklahoma first party "bad faith" law, which
was previously mentioned, is quite similar to section 8371, and de-
fines "bad faith" as the "malicious, willful and oppressive refusal
to pay a valid claim." 85
Perhaps the best definition for section 8371 "bad faith" is found
in the Pennsylvania rulings on awards of punitive damages. As
noted previously, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in
Rizzo v Hainesa8 that punitive damages may only be awarded "if
the conduct was malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or oppres-
sive." This standard for punitive damages in Pennsylvania has
been consistently applied by the Pennsylvania Courts for
decades.7
Another area of Pennsylvania law supporting this definition of
"bad faith" is the law concerning the awarding of attorney's fees.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that a "court may re-
quire a party to pay another participant's counsel fees if the
party's conduct in commencing the action was 'arbitrary, vexatious
or in bad faith.' "88 Pennsylvania statutory law notes that a partici-
pant may be "awarded counsel fees as a sanction against another
82. Anderson, 271 NW2d at 379.
83. Bibeault v Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A2d 313, 319 (RI 1980).
84. McCullough v Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P2d 855, 860-61 (Wyo 1990).
85. Christian, 577 P2d at 905.
86. 520 Pa 484, 555 A2d 58, 69 (1989).
87. See Chambers v Montgomery, 411 Pa)339,.192 A2d 355 (1963). The standard used
in Pennsylvania for rewarding punitive damages is the most appropriate definition for "bad
faith" because it is a standard which has been developed and used by the Commonwealth's
courts. It makes more sense to allow the courts to use a standard with whichthey are famil-
iar, instead of adopting another state's definition which is similar in its effect.
88. Santilo v Robinson, 383 Pa Super 604, 557 A2d 416, 417 (1989) (quoting Brenckle
v Arblaster, 320 Pa Super 87, 466 A2d 1075 (1983)).
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participant for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct during the
pendency of a matter." 89 As one can see, the language from the
standard for the awarding of counsel fees is similar in its effect to
the standard for the awarding of punitive damages. Both are very
high standards which are difficult to meet. Not coincidentally, one
of the remedies available in section 8371 is the award of attorney's
fees. Therefore, if the punitive damages standard is the standard
used to define "bad faith," then section 8371's interpretation and
application will remain thoroughly consistent with Pennsylvania
law already established.
CONCLUSION
Section 8371, if interpreted correctly, may be one of the solu-
tions to Pennsylvania's history of troubled automobile insurance
laws. The statute must not be limited to automobile insurance dis-
putes; rather, the law's scope must extend to all types of insurance.
The statute's effective date was July 1, 1990. While the statute is
not retroactive, if one of the law's two elements occurs after that
date, then the statute should be applied. Obviously, if both ele-
ments occur after the July 1 effective date, then the statute will
apply.
Section 8371 must include actions which are initiated in arbitra-
tion. The statute will not be given its fullest effect if its presence is
limited to actual courtroom proceedings. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the concept of "bad faith" and the awarding of damages
must be determined by the judge who oversees the proceedings.
Section 8371 may not have the effect -the legislature intended if it
is placed in the hands of a jury..
This new statute cannot stand alone as a cause of action. Section
8371 must act as a parasite and "piggyback" its way into court by
way of a contract action on the insurance policy. Because section
8371 is not the first party "bad faith" tort which Gruenberg and
Anderson introduced, the statute - although a cause of action -
must only be given the effects of a remedy.
"Bad faith" must not be defined as unreasonable conduct on the
part of an insurer in the settlement of an insurance claim having
knowledge that this conduct is unreasonable. "Bad faith" must be
given a higher and stricter standard. It is suggested that the stan-
89. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2503(7) (Purdon 1976).
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dard used to determine punitive damages should be applied as the
definition for section 8371 "bad faith."
C. Christopher Hasson
II. LIMITED TORT OPTION
Pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibilities Act,90
a person injured in an automobile accident is free to pursue any
and all damages which he has suffered as a result of that accident.
The injured individual is almost immediately entitled to the first
party benefits enumerated in section 1712, which include: medical
benefits, income loss benefits, accidental death benefits, funeral
benefits, and/or any combination thereof. The injured individual
is, thereafter, free to bring an action against the tortfeasor to ob-
tain damages for his injuries.
House Bill 121 may potentially cause drastic changes in this sys-
tem through the introduction of section 1705 to Title 75. Pursuant
to this new section, the insured must be given the option to select
either "full tort" or "limited tort" coverage. If the insured chooses
"full tort" coverage, he may seek compensation for his injuries in a
normal manner pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsi-
bilities Act. His recovery may include any and all damages which
he is entitled to under traditional tort law, including pain and suf-
fering damages. However, if the insured chooses limited tort cover-
age, he is only free to pursue the economic losses which he has
suffered as a consequence of the accident. Pursuant to the limited
tort option, the insured waives his right to bring an action for pain
and suffering damages and other nonmonetary detriment in ex-
change for a reduction in his insurance premiums. There are, how-
ever, several enumerated exceptions to the rule precluding actions
for pain, suffering and other nonmonetary detriment.
This section will analyze the purpose of this new limited tort
system and the statutorily enumerated exceptions in an attempt to
assist in the application of the new limited tort system.
A. Full Tort Coverage
When the full tort option is chosen, the insured is permitted a
complete recovery for injuries arising out of the operation of a mo-
tor vehicle, including pain and suffering damages.9 1 A demonstra-
90. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1701 et seq (Purdon 1984).
91. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(c) states, "Each person who is bound by the full tort
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tion that the defendant was at fault remains a prerequisite to re-
covery."' The determination regarding fault should be made
pursuant to applicable tort law.93 Therefore, section 1705(c) simply
permits the insured to retain any and all tort rights which arise out
of an automobile accident and to decline participation in the lim-
ited tort/no-fault system."'
B. Limited Tort Coverage
By choosing the limited tort option, the insured agrees to waive
his right to bring an action for noneconomic losses (pain and suf-
fering damages),9 in exchange for a reduction in his automobile
insurance premiums.9 6 However, this waiver of pain and suffering
damages is not absolute. If a serious injury is suffered or one of six
enumerated conditions is satisfied, the insured is free to initiate an
action for pain, suffering and any other nonmonetary detriment
which the accident may have caused.9 7 Apparently, therefore, sec-
tion 1705(d) simply operates as a preliminary threshold which
must be satisfied in order to bring an action for pain and suffering
election remains eligible to seek compensation for the noneconomic loss claimed and eco-
nomic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another
person pursuant to applicable tort law." The term "noneconomic loss" is defined in 75 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 1702 as "pain suffering and other nonmonetary detriment."
92. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §1705(c).
93. Id.
94. Note that failure to expressly make a choice between full tort and limited tort
coverage will automatically result in full tort coverage. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(a)(1)(E).
Therefore, affirmative conduct from the insured is necessary to waive the right to
noneconomic losses. Also note that the option chosen by the named insured shall bind each
and every member of the named insured's household who is covered by that policy and who
is not a named insured under another policy. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1705(b)(1) and (2).
95. See note 91 for a definition of noneconomic losses.
96. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(d).
97. Following is an outline of the basic framework of section 1705(d):
General Rule: Insured may recover only economic damages.
Exceptions to the general rule, -which permit the insured to bring an action for
noneconomic losses:
1. Where the insured has suffered a serious injury;
2. Where the tortfeasor:
- was driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance;
- is operating an out of state vehicle;
- intentionally caused the insured's injuries;
- was uninsured;
3. The insured may bring a products liability action seeking noneconomic
losses against a person in the business of manufacturing or maintaining motor
vehicles;
4. The insured may bring an action for noneconomic damages if he was an
occupant of any vehicle other than a private passenger motor vehicle.
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damages.
The purpose of the new optional limited tort section must be
derived through implication and analogy, because the legislature
declined to include any explanatory language in the new section.
The basic purpose of all no-fault systems may be summarized gen-
erally as follows: first, expediting the compensation of accident vic-
tims by removing fault as a predicate to recovery and second, the
elimination of litigation over the amount of compensation owed,
through the implementation of a statutorily structured scale of
damages.98 The reduction of litigation reduces legal costs for the
insurance companies; such savings are then passed on to the in-
sured in the form of lower premiums.
Pennsylvania's new optional limited tort system encompasses
only the second of these general purposes. Section 1705(d), by its
express language, only imposes a structured scheme of recoverable
damages. The language of section 1705(d) does not address the is-
sues regarding expediting the compensation of accident victims; it
does not remove fault as a prerequisite to recovery. To the con-
trary, the express language of section 1705(d) imposes fault as a
prerequisite to the recovery of any damages, economic or
noneconomic.9
Damages are divided into two categories by section 1705(d), eco-
nomic and noneconomic. When these measures of damages are an-
alyzed, the purpose behind the statute becomes apparent.
Noneconomic loss is defined in section 1702 as pain, suffering and
other nonmonetary detriment. Any damages not within the scope
of this definition must be economic losses. Essentially, economic
losses would include all monetary detriment suffered as a result of
the accident. 100 Examples of these losses would include hospital
and doctors expenses, as well as lost wages. These losses are easily
calculated and just as easily verified or confirmed. However,
noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering are not subject to
easy calculation or verification. The amount of compensation for
noneconomic losses, therefore, often leads to dispute, which then
leads to litigation. Economic losses do not have these conse-
quences, because they are so easily subject to objective verification.
98. Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483, 330 NW2d. 22, 27 (1982).
99. Section 1705(d) states in part, "Each person who elects the limited tort alterna-
tive remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle
accident as the consequence of the fault of another pursuant to applicable tort law. 75
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(d) (emphasis added).
100. See note 91 to distinguish noneconomic from economic losses.
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The effect of section 1705(d) is to preclude claims for noneconomic
losses where the injury is not serious. 10 1 Thus, the purpose of this
new limited tort system must necessarily be to reduce the amount
of litigation over noneconomic loss issues where the plaintiff is not
seriously injured. This reduction would decrease the legal costs of
the insurers and permit those insureds who participate in the sys-
tem to share in this savings through reduced automobile insurance
premiums.
Such a rule which denies injured persons a recovery for losses
not measurable in dollars seems harsh and unjust. However, the
Pennsylvania limited tort system alleviates much of this harshness
and injustice. First, and most importantly, the limited tort system
is optional; that is, one is not forced to choose the limited tort
option. In fact, if the insured fails to expressly make a choice, the
insured is deemed to have opted for full tort coverage. 10 2 Next, the
injured individual is only precluded from bringing a claim for such
damages where the injury is not serious, and where the accident is
not within the scope of one of the six other exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of preclusion.
Viewing the exceptions to the general rule as a whole makes it
apparent that the circumstances in which the general rule applies
are very limited. 03 First, the drunk driving exception would permit
11.2% of all traffic accident victims to recover noneconomic losses
if they had participated in the limited tort system. 04 Second,
where the cause of the accident is due to the defective manufac-
ture or design of the car, the insured is free to pursue whatever
damages he can recover. Similarly, where the tortfeasor is operat-
ing a vehicle registered out of state, or is not adequately insured
pursuant to the Financial Responsibility Act, 05 the victim may re-
cover noneconomic losses. And most importantly, the victim is free
to pursue noneconomic losses if he has suffered a serious injury.
Thus, the victim is only precluded from claiming noneconomic
101. Also note that there are five other exceptions to the general preclusion of
noneconomic claims under section 1705(d). 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(d). See note 97.
102. (Emphasis added). See note 94. Note that the named insured's choice will bind
all those covered by the policy who are not named insureds under another policy. Thus,
those individuals do not technically have a choice; however, those persons in most cases are
the named insured's children and, therefore, do not have a choice about much of anything.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1705(b)(1) and (2).
103. See 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1705(d)(1).
104. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 1989 Accident
Statistics.
105. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1701 et seq.
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losses where he is not seriously injured and the accident was
caused by the fault of an individual who is driving a vehicle regis-
tered in Pennsylvania and who is adequately insured.
Probably, the most important issue regarding the limited tort
system is how the term "serious injury" will be defined, and who
will apply the definition. "Serious injury" is defined in section 1702
as "a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of
body function or permanent serious disfigurement." ' Arguably,
this definition is no more specific or particular than the term "seri-
ous injury." While there will be little dispute as to the applicability
of the serious injury exception in an action for noneconomic losses
of an individual killed in the accident, there will be a plethora of
argument as to what injuries constitute "serious impairment of
body function" and/or a "permanent serious disfigurement."
Interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory language
seems to be of little help due to the subjective nature of these
terms. What may be a serious impairment of body function to one
person may be a minor or trivial hinderance to another. For exam-
ple, even minor damage to the hands of surgeon may preclude him
from pursing his career, while the same injury to a lawyer would go
unnoticed. Serious disfigurement, similarly, is a concept not easily
placed on an objective scale.
The legislative history sheds some light on the meaning these
terms were intended to be given. The newly adopted Pennsylvania
definition of "serious injury" is a verbatim enactment of the Michi-
gan no-fault threshold language. 107 The similarity is not coinciden-
tal: Governor Robert Casey and Representative Richard Hayden
are said to have indicated that they were trying to enact the Michi-
gan threshold.108 During debate on the floor over an initial version
106. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1702.
107. See Leonard A. Sloane, Pennsylvania's Optional Verbal Threshold, 8 Pennsylva-
nia Automobile Insurance Law 75 (Trial Advocacy Foundation of Pennsylvania, 8th ed
(1990).
Pennsylvania:
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann section 1702 defines serious injury, as a "personal injury result-
ing in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigure-
ment." (Emphasis added.)
Michigan:
Mich Comp Laws § 500.3135; Mich Stat Ann § 24.13135 (Callaghan 1973) states in
part: "A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or
her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigure-
ment." (Emphasis added.)
108. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Automobile Insurance Law at 73 (cited in note 107).
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of this bill containing the Michigan language, Representative Ste-
phen Freind stated,
What we have just done is passed an optional no-fault which has a verbal
threshold, which in fact is the Michigan verbal threshold . . .l
Subsequent versions of the bill Were modeled after Other states'
thresholds. 110 However, the final version enacted February 7, 1990
contained a verbatim copy of the Michigan threshold."'
Michigan's statute was enacted in 1973; therefore, a substantial
body of case law interpreting this threshold language has evolved.
An historical review of the development of this concept in Michi-
gan may assist in defining which injuries are within its scope and
which are not; it may also further muddy what are already murky
waters.
The history of the Michigan threshold can be broken down into
three periods: Advisory Opinion,"12 Cassidy,' 3 and DiFranco.
4
1. Advisory Opinion Period (1973-1982)
In Advisory Opinion Re: Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294,1 5
the Michigan Supreme Court was asked to render an advisory
opinion regarding the constitutionality of the newly-enacted Mich-
igan No-Fault Auto Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as "Ad-
visory Opinion")."' One of several issues addressed by the court
was whether the terms "serious impairment of body function" and
"permanent serious disfigurement" provided standards constitu-
tionally sufficient for legal interpretation."' The Michigan Su-
preme Court held that these terms were comparable to many
others, in various facets of the law, which both juries and judges
interpret every day." 8 The court reasoned that the terms "serious
109. Id at 74 (cited in note 107) (citing Legislative Journal- House, No 42 at 986
(June 13, 1989).
110. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Automobile Insurance Law at 74 (cited in note 107).
111. Id (cited in note 107).
112. Advisory Opinion Re: Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 208
NW2d 469 (1973).
113. Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483, 330 NW2d 22 (1982).
114. DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 398 NW2d 896 (1986). Please note that Mr.
Sloan divided the history of the Michigan threshold into three periods. See note 107 for the
relevant cite.
115. 389 Mich 441, 208 NW2d 469 (1973).
116. See Mich Comp Laws § 500.3135 (1973); Mich Stat Ann § 24.13135 (Callaghan
1973).
117. Advisory Opinion, 208 NW2d at 480.
118. Id.
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impairment of body function" and "permanent serious disfigure-
ment" were comprised of commonly-used English words, so that
their application by juries would be no more difficult or less precise
than application of terms such as the "reasonably careful person,"
"proximate cause," or "willful and wanton misconduct."' 119
.Additionally, the Advisory Opinion court held that the determi-
nation of whether a particular injury constituted a serious impair-
ment of body function or a permanent serious disfigurement was
within the exclusive province of the jury and was to be decided on
a case-by-case basis.'2 0 The court may only intervene when the
jury's determination transgresses permissible limits, thereby mak-
ing the determination a matter of law, rather than fact. '
2
119. Id at 482.
120. Id. More specifically the Michigan Supreme Court stated: "Such findings result
from denominated fact questions and thus are within the exclusive province of the triers of
fact. Only when interpretation approaches or breaches permissible limits does it become a
question of law for the Court. Such questions must be approached on a case by case basis."
Id at 480.
121. Id. During the Advisory Opinion period, the question of whether the following
injuries constituted serious impairments of body functions and/or permanent serious disfig-
urements were held to be JURY QUESTIONS:
1. Broken arm in a cast for six weeks. Earls v Herrick, 107 Mich App 657, 309 NW2d 694
(1981).
2. Injuries to neck, back and shoulders which were treated by doctor immediately after the
accident and continued to be treated by doctor through the time of the hearing, where the
doctor instructed plaintiff to stay off of feet and where the injured was unable to do house-
work, lift anything heavy and had headaches twice a week for which pain medication was
prescribed. Pickens v Prince, 106 Mich App 314, 308 NW2d 178 (1981).
3. Head, neck and leg injuries resulting in constant pain. Echols v Rule, 105 Mich App 405,
306 NW2d 530 (1981).
4. Complete breaks of both bones in the lower right leg of a farmer who was required to
wear four different casts between August 1975 and March 1976, who then had to use
crutches and thereafter a walker; the leg returned to only fifty percent of normal use by
time of trial with continued pain, all of which caused the farmer to be incapable of working.
Cassidy v McGovern, 98 Mich App 100, 296 NW2d 200 (1980).
5. Tendonitis of the bicep tendon in the right, arm, where movement was possible but persis-
tent pain occurred in the shoulder. McKendrick v Petrucci, 71 Mich App 200, 247 NW2d
349 (1976).
6. The existence of mental or emotional injuries. Luce v Gerow, 89 Mich App 546, 280
NW2d 592 (1979).
In the following cases the injuries were determined to constitute SERIOUS IMPAIR-
MENTS OF BODY FUNCTIONS AND/OR PERMANENT SERIOUS
DISFIGUREMENTS:
7. Fractured clavicle, where condition was temporary and prognosis for recovery was excel-
lent; but for duration of convalescence, the plaintiff could not use arm or shoulder. Burk v
Warren, 105 Mich App 556, 307 NW2d 89 (1981).
.8. Spine sprain, pain in arms and legs, muscle spasms, loss of sensation and grip, and de-
pression. Pohl v Gilbert, 89 Mich App 176, 280 NW2d 831 (1979).
9. Plaintiff rendered a paraplegic. Workman v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Ex-
644
1991 Comments 645
Under the authority of the Michigan Supreme Court's Advisory
Opinion,122 several principles governing the application of the
Michigan No-Fault threshold have developed. First, and probably
most important, is the standard to determine whether the plain-
tiff's claim for pain and suffering damages was sufficient to submit
to the jury, i.e., the standard for determining whether the plaintiff
crossed the summary judgment hurdle. The Michigan Supreme
Court briefly addressed this issue in Advisory Opinion,123 where it
stated,
Only when interpretation approaches or breaches permissible limits does it
become a question of law for the Court. Such questions must be approached
on a case by case basis.""4
Vitale v Danylak125 was the first case to determine that this stan-
dard had been satisfied and that summary judgment was appropri-
ate. In Vitale the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant, where the
plaintiff's sole injury was a stiff neck which lasted only a week and
was treated with minimal medication.
12
6
Subsequently, it was held that a court, in determining whether
change, 404 Mich 477, 274 NW2d 373 (1979).
In the following cases the injuries where determined NOT to constitute serious impair-
ments of body functions and/or permanent serious disfigurements:
10. Abrasions, contusions and attendant minor discomforts. Burk v Warren, 105 Mich App
556, 307 NW2d 89 (1981).
11. Bruises on legs and knee which did not prevent plaintiff from sitting or standing and
disappeared after two weeks, bump on the head which healed in one month, neck and back
pains which required no medication and were treated with heating pad only; within one
month the plaintiff was working a full shift and performing regular household duties. Her-
mann v Haney, 98 Mich App 445, 296 NW2d 278 (1980).
12. Arm and wrist injury, where the plaintiff did not seek treatment until four weeks later
from a chiropractor, who gave plaintiff heat treatment and medication; plaintiff returned to
chiropractor at intervals of three to four weeks and sought no other medical treatment.
Brooks v Reed, 93 Mich App 166, 286 NW2d 81 (1979).
13. Headaches, stiff neck, and knee pains. Harris v McVickers, 88 Mich App 508, 276 NW2d
629 (1979).
14. Stiff neck, which was treated with minimal medication and which disappeared within a
week. Vitale v Danylak, 74 Mich App 615, 254 NW2d 593 (1977).
122. 389 Mich 441, 208 NW2d 469 (1973).
123. Advisory Opinion, 208 NW2d at 469.
124. Id at 480.
125. 74 Mich App 615, 254 NW2d 593 (1977).
126. Vitale, 254 NW2d at593. The Vitale court stated, "[W]here the legal interpreta-
tion of the terms in question 'approaches or breaches permissible limits' the interpretation
becomes a question of law for the trial court. While the opinion did not specify where the
'permissible limits' are drawn, this Court is of the opinion that if any class of cases could
approach such limitation, the case at bar must be included in that class." Id at 595.
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the plaintiff's injuries satisfied the serious impairment threshold,
could grant summary judgment only where the plaintiffs injuries
were such that no reasonable jury could view the impairment as
serious.'11 The Michigan courts identified several factors which
were relevant to the determination of whether an injury had satis-
fied the initial serious impairment threshold.'18 These factors in-
cluded: extent of the injury, treatment required, duration of disa-
bility, extent of residual impairment, and the prognosis for
eventual recovery.2 9 Thus, in Hermann v Haney'30 the Michigan
Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff had not satisfied
the initial threshold and, therefore, could not submit her case to a
jury where her injuries consisted of only bruises on her legs and
knees, and a bump on her head. 31
In summary, the Advisory Opinion period did not define or clar-
ify the statutory threshold language; instead satisfaction of the
threshold was to be decided by a jury, based on their common eve-
ryday understanding of the term "serious impairment of a body
function." Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the
determination of the threshold question could the court make the
determination as a matter of law, and thereby prevent a full trial.
As the next period suggests, these principles were not etched in
stone.
2. Cassidy Period (1982-1986)
In Cassidy v McGovern12 the Michigan Supreme Court came
full circle from its decision in Advisory Opinion,33 and held that
application of the "serious impairment" threshold was a question
of statutory interpretation. As such, the question was to be deter-
mined by the court, not the jury.'3 ' Absent a controversy regarding
127. Brooks v Reed, 93 Mich App 166, 286 NW2d 81 (1979).
128. Hermann v Haney, 98 Mich App-445, 296 NW2d 278 (1980).
129. Hermann, 296 NW2d at 278. See also, Echols v Rule, 105 Mich App 405, 306
NW2d 530 (1981), where the court held that there was a jury question as to whether a
plaintiff who suffered head, neck and leg injuries with attendant pain was a serious impair-
ment; Burk v Warren, 105 Mich App 556, 307 NW2d 89 (1981); Pickens v Prince, 106 Mich
App 314, 308 NW2d 178 (1981), where it was also held that there was a jury question as to
whether the plaintiff's injuries were a serious impairment.
130. Hermann, 296 NW2d at 278.
131. Id.
132. 415 Mich 483, 330 NW2d 22 (1982).
133. Advisory Opinion, 208 NW2d at 469.
134. Cassidy, 330 NW2d at 22. Under the Cassidy rule, the following injuries were
determined to be SERIOUS IMPAIRMENTS OF BODY FUNCTIONS:
1. Plaintiff, who was previously suffering from "lumbar myositis and lumbosacral strain with
646 Vol. 29:619
1991 Comments
the extent of the injury, therefore, the case is properly a subject for
a possibility of a herniated invertebral disc," was involved in a minor accident which caused
a re-occurrence of lumbar myositis, a possible herniated disc in the low back, cervical my-
ofascitis and high blood pressure resulting from the stress of the re-occurrence of the inju-
ries. The injuries restricted the amount of weight she could lift, and the period of time
which she could sit or stand. Chumley v Chrysler Corporation, 156 Mich App 474, 401
NW2d 879 (1986).
2. Plaintiff suffered compression fractures of first and second lumbar vertebrae, causing the
plaintiff extreme discomfort when he attempted to perform normal activities such as lifting
groceries, walking long distances, or standing or lying down for extended periods of time.
Freel v Dehaan, 155 Mich App 517, 400 NW2d 316 (1986).
3. Plaintiff's loss of memory constitutes loss of important body function and may be a seri-
ous impairment depending on the extent. Shaw v Martin, 155 Mich App 89, 399 NW2d 450
(1986).
4. Plaintiff's back injury caused her to wear a back brace continuously for five years after
the accident, caused her to need medical treatment on a weekly basis, and caused her to be
unable to return to work for three and one half years despite her repeated attempts. Wood v
Dart, 154 Mich App 586, 397 NW2d 843 (1986).
5. Plaintiff suffered six broken ribs causing potential lung complications and additional
treatment to avoid such complications. Esparaza v Manning, 148 Mich App 371, 384 NW2d
168 (1986).
6. Plaintiff suffered six fractured ribs, fracture of the right clavicle and small toe of right
foot. Range v Gorosh, 140 Mich App 712, 364 NW2d 686 (1985).
7. Plaintiff suffered a broken clavicle, fractured left leg which required surgery and the in-
sertion of a steel rod in her thigh; submission of this question to the jury was error.
Lahousse v Hess, 125 Mich App 14, 336 NW2d 219 (1983). p
8. Aggravation of the plaintiff's pre-existing back condition, causing acceleration of its dete-
rioration. Galli v Reutter, 148 Mich App 313, 384'NW2d 43 (1985).
The following injuries were held INSUFFICIENT to satisfy the serious impairment of body
function threshold:
9. Plaintiff suffered bump on the clavicle or collar bone, a chronic grade two acromioclavicu-
lar separation of the left shoulder, an atrophied droop to that shoulder, all of which pre-
vented her from returning to work as a waitress until she successfully underwent corrective
surgery; the injuries did not interfere, in a significant manner, with the victim's ability to
lead a normal life. Ulery v Coy, 153 Mich App 551, 396 NW2d 480 (1986).
10. Plaintiff suffering a laceration of the eyelid' and a blow to the chest, which caused an
irregular electrocardiogram immediately after the accident (the plaintiff's electrocardiogram
readings subsequently returned to normal); injuries did not affect the plaintiff's ability to
lead a normal life. Kanaziz v Rounds, 153 Mich App 180, 395 NW2d 278 (1986).
11. Plaintiff suffered a cervical strain or soft tissue injury in the neck; plaintiff could not
demonstrate any objective manifestation of the injury; pain and suffering do not constitute
an objective manifestation. Bennett v Oakley, 153 Mich App 622, 396 NW2d 451 (1986).
12. Plaintiff suffered two comminuted fractures of the humerus bone causing the plaintiff to
be hospitalized for three days and to wear a cast for two and onehalf months; plaintiff was
able to return to her normal life within eleven weeks after the accident. Kroft v Kines, 154
Mich App 448, 397 NW2d 822 (1986).
13. Plaintiff suffered from neck pain causing her to seek medical treatment, thus limiting
her ability to engage .in household tasks and certain hobbies such as gardening; pain and
suffering do not constitute an objective manifestation of the injury. Schubot v Thayer, 156
Mich App 545, 402 NW2d 2 (1986).
14. Plaintiff suffered soreness, stiffness, tenderness in muscles and pain in his back and leg,
causing a reduction in the flexibility of his spine to 50% of normal. Clark v Auto Club Ins.
Assoc., 150 Mich App 546, 389 NW2d 718 (1986).
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summary disposition by the judge. 35 Not surprisingly, during the
Cassidy period cases generally were disposed of by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment,136 unless there was a question re-
garding the extent of the plaintiff's injury which would require a
jury determination. This drastic departure from the Advisory
Opinion rule (cases normally being decided by the jury, except
those extreme situations where the judge could permissibly make
the determination as a matter of law) drastically reduced the num-
ber of cases litigated."3 '
Cassidy actually consisted of two cases consolidated for purposes
of appeal. In the first, Cassidy v McGovern, ss the plaintiff broke
both bones in his leg and spent substantial periods of time in con-
valescence. After a period of convalescence,3 ' the leg was only re-
habilitated to fifty percent of its normal use, but astonishingly the
15. Plaintiff suffered a broken arm restricting the use of the arm for four months. Farquhar
v Owens, 149 Mich App 208, 385 NW2d 751 (1986).
16. Plaintiff suffered minimal compression fracture of L3 vertebra, the only permanent af-
fects of which were that she could not bend and lift as she once could and might have to
take pain medication occasionally. Walker v Caldwell, 148 Mich App 827, 385 NW2d 703
(1986).
17. Plaintiff suffered soft tissue injury known as chronic myofascitis, an inflammatory condi-
tion of the muscle and connective tissue of the back; injury did not satisfy the objective
manifestation requirement. Cochran v Myers, 146 Mich App 729, 381 NW2d 800 (1985).
18. Plaintiff suffered from posttraumatic neurosis, resulting in anxiety, nervousness and
feelings of anger; not an objectively manifested injury. Garris v Vanderlaan, 146 Mich App
619, 381 NW2d 412 (1985).
19. Plaintiff suffered injuries leaving a scar three centimeters long under the left eye. Nelson
v Myers, 146 Mich App 444, 381 NW2d 407 (1985).
20. Ten percent limitation in the range of neck motion. Mills v Jollifi, 147 Mich App 746,
383 NW2d 134 (1985).
21. Dorsal vertebral strain and chronic crania-cervical injury which did not require the
plaintiff to miss any work. Denson v Garrison, 145 Mich App 516, 378 NW2d 532 (1985).
22. Loosening of four teeth and the fracture of the plaintiffs lateral incisor and lower center
incisor. Shortridge v Daily, 145 Mich App 547, 387 NW2d 544 (1985).
135. Cassidy, 330 NW2d at 22. Cases holding that THERE WAS A JURY QUES-
TION regarding the extent of the plaintiff's injuries include:
1. Plaintiff suffered head and back injuries; question went to extent of injuries. Shaw v
Martin, 155 Mich App 89, 399 NW2d 450 (1987).
2. Plaintiff suffered hematoma of his right leg (which required drainage and caused scar-
ring), a cracked bone in the leg, a lower back and hip injury, and various bumps and bruises;
question went to plaintiff's ability to walk. Akim v Slocum, 153 Mich App 337, 395 NW2d
269 (1986).
3. Plaintiff suffered a back injury causing contracture or spasm of the back muscles; ques-
tion went to whether the plaintiff's injuries affected her ability to live a normal life. Harris v
Lemicex, 152 Mich App 149, 393 NW2d 559 (1986).
136. See notes 134 and 135.
137. See DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 398 NW2d 896 (1986).
138. 98 Mich App 102, 296 NW2d 200 (1980).
139. Cassidy, 296 NW2d at 200.
jury had determined that the plaintiff had not suffered a serious
impairment of body function."1 0 The Michigan Supreme Court de-
termined that the plaintiff had, nonetheless, satisfied the threshold
requirements and was therefore permitted to recover noneconomic
damages.14
In the companion case, Hermann v Haney,4" the plaintiff had
suffered bruises on her legs and a bump on the head. 43 Summary
judgment for the defendant was granted by the trial court; the
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed. 44
The court held there were several factors to be taken into ac-
count when interpreting the serious impairment threshold. The
Michigan Legislature's purpose for precluding the recovery of
noneconomic losses was of primary importance to the court's ra-
tionale and was identified as one of these factors.145 The court
identified two purposes for the exclusion: first, to prevent the over-
compensation of minor injuries, and second, to reduce the exces-
sive litigation of motor vehicle accident cases.146 Regarding the sec-
ond, the court stated that,
if non-economic losses were always. to be a matter subject to adjudication
under the act, the goal of reducing motor vehicle accident litigation would
likely be illusory.
4 7
The court stated that the second factor for consideration when
interpreting the serious impairment threshold was the context in
which the threshold was placed. The two other threshold require-
ments were permanent serious disfigurement and death.1 48 The
court concluded that the legislature would have been inconsistent
in constructing two very high thresholds and one "insignificant ob-
stacle. 1 49 Obviously, the legislature determined that serious im-
pairment of body function was intended to be of a severity
equivalent to death or permanent serious disfigurement.
After these guidelines to interpretation of the serious impair-
ment threshold were set forth, the court addressed the statutory
140. See Cassidy v McGovern in note 121, example 4.
141. Cassidy, 330 NW2d 22.
142. Hermann v Haney, 98 Mich App 445, 296 NW2d 278 (1980).
143. Hermann, 296 NW2d at 278. See Hermann v Haney in note 121, example 11.
144. Hermann, 296 NW2d at 278.
145. Cassidy, 330 NW2d at 22.
146. Id.
147. Id at 28.




language.150 The "impairment of body function" requirement was
defined as an impairment which would interfere with the plaintiff's
general ability to live a normal life. 151 Because walking is an impor-
tant part of normal life, the court determined that the Cassidy in-
jury satisfied this standard.5
The court also introduced an objectivity requirement into its se-
rious impair:ment test,1 53 concluding that the language used by the
legislature, "serious impairment of body function," dictated that
the injury be objectively manifested.15 4 Thus, pain and suffering
alone, regardless of the severity, would be insufficient to establish
an objectively manifested impairment. 155 Instead, the injury must
affect the functioning of the body. Because the Cassidy injury (two
broken bones in the right leg) impaired the functioning of the
body, namely walking, it satisfied the objectivity requirement."5 '
In measuring the severity of the injury, the court looked to the
longevity of the impairment as a factor.1 57 Although the injury did
not have to be permanent, such a finding would certainly weigh in
the decision. 58 Thus, the court determined that the Cassidy in-
jury, which included "18 days of hospitalization, seven months of
wearing casts during which dizzy spells further affected his mobil-
ity, and at least a minor residual effect one and one-half years later
was sufficient to satisfy the threshold. 159 On the other hand,
the Hermann injury, which impaired the plaintiff for only a rela-
tively short period, was determined not to be serious enough to
satisfy this requirement. 6 '
In summary, the Cassidy court defined a serious impairment as
an injury which: (1) effects the plaintiff's ability to live a normal
life; (2) is objectively manifested; and (3) is of a severity which is
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Note that the Court expressly rejected two alternative interpretations regard-
ing the body function which needed to be impaired. The first would permit recovery where
"any body function" was impaired; even impairment of a little finger would satisfy this
standard. The second would require impairment of the "total body function," thereby re-
quiring the injury to be life-threatening. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court reached this conclusion without setting forth any reasoning as to









consistent with the severity of the other two threshold require-
ments, death and permanent' serious disfigurement. In addition,
the court stated that the determination of whether the particular
injury satisfied the threshold was a question for the court, not the
jury. Through this interpretation, the court believed that the pur-
pose of the threshold was most effectively achieved, because such a
reading would eliminate the overpayment of minor injuries and re-
duce accident litigation. These newly held principles were etched
no deeper in stone, however, than were those. under the Advisory
Opinion.
3. DiFranco Period (1986-present)
Again, in DiFranco v Pickard61 the Michigan Supreme Court
drastically altered its interpretation of the serious impairment
threshold, totally departing from the rules previously announced
by Cassidy.16 2 The DiFranco court held that the trier of fact
should determine whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impair-
ment whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to dif-
fer."'3 The court further stated that the judge was precluded from
making the decision as a matter of law where there was a factual
dispute regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries,
or where reasonable minds could differ as to whether the injury
satisfied the threshold.1 4 If either of these factors is present, then
the judge must leave the determination to the-jury."6 5 The results
of this holding are best illustrated by the court's disposition of the
five cases before it.' 66 In all five of these cases, the court deter-
mined that reasonable minds could differ, and that the case should
have been decided by the jury.
167
161. 427 Mich 32, 398 NW2d 896 (1986).
162. Cassidy, 330 NW2d at 22.
163. DiFranco, 398 NW2d at 900. The court took no chances in having its opinion
misread; it listed its holdings, in headnote type fashion, at the beginning of the opinion. Id.
164. Id at 901.
165. Id.
166. Five cases were consolidated on appeal: DiFranco v Pickard, Burk v Warren,
Paupore v Rouse, Kucera v Norton, and Routley v Dault. Id.
167. Note that in DiFranco,.the jury had determined that the plaintiff had not suf-
fered a serious impairment, and the court affirmed; in Burk, the court held that the case had
properly been submitted to the jury and thus affirmed the jury's determination that the
plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of body function; in Paupore, the court af-
firmed a jury verdict finding no serious impairment; in Kucera, the court re-instated a jury
verdict for the plaintiff which had been overturned by a j.n.o.v.; in Routley, the court re-
versed a summary judgment for the defendant, holding that reasonable minds could differ,
and, therefore, the jury must make the determination. DiFranco, 398 NW2d at 918-25.
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The rationale for making the threshold question one for the trier
of fact, rather than a question of law for the judge, is based on the
court's newly determined purpose of the Michigan No-Fault Act.
In examining the Act, the court concluded that "limiting tort lia-
bility for noneconomic losses is not an essential feature of no-fault
act."' 68 The court reasoned, however, that the primary purpose of,
no-fault acts was to reduce the number of economic loss cases,
rather than non-economic, loss cases. 69 In addition, the court rec-
ognized that this departure from judge to jury would increase the
number of non-economic loss cases litigated. 7 °
The court made clear that the serious impairment threshold did
not apply only to the catastrophically injured.' Instead, the
threshold was only intended to eliminate claims for pain and suf-
fering arising from minor injuries. 72 In this vein, the "ability to
live a normal life" test adopted by Cassidy was totally dis-
carded.17 Under DiFranco the impairment need not affect the
plaintiff's ability to live a normal life, but could be limited to a
single particular body function if the injury was serious enough to
impair that function. 74 In effect, the test involved inquiry into
which body function had been impaired and how the injury had
affected that particular body function. 175 Satisfaction of this test
was held to ordinarily necessitate expert medical testimony to es-
tablish the existence, extent, and permanency of the
impairment.
76
DiFranco also modified the objectivity requirement announced
in Cassidy.1" The objectivity test announced in Cassidy evolved,
168. Id at 908.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The court reached this conclusion based on the legislative history underlying the
Michigan No-Fault Act. The Michigan Legislature had rejected more stringent thresholds in
favor of the serious impairment standard; therefore, they likely did not intend an extremely
high threshold. DiFranco 398 NW2d at 904.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The court identified several factors to determine whether an injury was seri-
ous. The impairment is often expressed in numerical terms, such as a person suffering a
seventy-five percent limitation of motion. The length of time the impairment of body func-
tion lasts is also a consideration. The treatment required may likewise be relevant. Lastly, a
comparison of the plaintiffs activities and abilities before and after the injury is relevant to
establish the seriousness of the injury. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. DiFranco, 398 NW2d at 915.
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through subsequent cases interpreting Cassidy,17 8 into a standard
which required the injury to be subject to medical measurement. 7
This standard distinguished symptoms of injuries from injuries
themselves.""° Pain, regardless of the severity, was held to be a
symptom not subject to medical measurement; pain alone, there-
fore, could never satisfy the objective manifestation require-
ment. 8 ' DiFranco altered this requirement, holding that any med-
ically identifiable injury satisfied the objective manifestation
element of the threshold.
18 2
In summary, the DiFranco court determined that the Cassidy
rules were too harsh and, therefore, were not effectuating the legis-
lative intent underlying the Michigan no-fault threshold. This in-
tent was not to reduce the number of cases litigated, but was to
preclude only those noneconomic cases where the injuries were mi-
nor. Thus, the DiFranco court placed the threshold determination
back in the hands of the jury, and only permitted the judge to
make such findings as a matter of law where reasonable minds
could not differ as to the conclusion and where there was no fac-
tual dispute as to the extent of the injuries. Similarly, the objective
manifestation requirement was softened to only require medical
identification of the injury, rather than medical measurement. The
end product of this change permits many more cases to proceed
through a full trial, which, in turn, permits many more plaintiffs to
obtain damages for their pain and suffering.1
83
178. See Williams v Payne, 131 Mich App 403, 346 NW2d 564 (1984).
179. Williams, 346 NW2d at 568 (emphasis added). Medical measurement, as applied
by the court, requires that the injury be subject to verification through some type of medical
test. Absent such a verification, the injury is said not to be measurable. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. DiFranco, 398 NW2d at 918.
183. The following cases decided under DiFranco presented a serious impairment
question FOR THE JURY:
1. Soft tissue injuries to the muscles and ligaments of plaintiff's back, which caused muscle
spasms, pain and limited his range of motion; such injuries did not constitute serious im-
pairment. DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 398 NW2d 896 (1986).
2. Abrasions, contusions and attendant minor did not constitute a serious impairment. Burk
v Warren, 105 Mich App 556, 307 NW2d 89 (1981).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED in the following cases:
4. Plaintiff with a lumbosacral strain did not sustain serious impairment as matter of law.
Johnston v Thorsby, 163 Mich App 161, 413 NW2d 696 (1987).
5. A small, hardly discernible tissue scar immediately below plaintiff's lip was not a perma-
nent serious disfigurement as a matter of law. Petaja v Guck, 178 Mich App 577, 444 NW2d
209 (1989).
For a more complete list of cases decided under DiFranco, see Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Auto
Insurance Law at 87 (cited in note 105).
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C. Proposed Approached For Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania's Optional Verbal Threshold,16 ' the author Mr.
Sloane argues that Pennsylvania should adopt DiFranco and those
cases decided thereunder as the Pennsylvania standard. 185 The ra-
tionale of this argument is based on the legislative intent underly-
ing the Pennsylvania Act and the similarity between the Michigan
and Pennsylvania threshold language.' 86 The basic purpose of the
Pennsylvania threshold is said to be a careful balance between the
protection of an individual's access to the courts and a reduction in
automobile insurance premiums.187
The importance of the individual's access to the courts is made
evident by various facts. First, a previous version of House Bill
121188 contained a preamble which set forth the purpose for the
threshold. This preamble was subsequently removed before House
Bill 121 was enacted. The preamble to House Bill 431 stated that
the intent and purpose of the threshold was to eliminate ninety-
percent of the bodily injury claims resulting from minor automo-
bile accidents, thereby removing the major cause of the escalation
of auto insurance rates.'8 9 Because this language was deleted, Mr.
Sloane reasons that the legislature did not intend to reduce minor
automobile accident claims by ninety-percent. 9 '
Second, a review of the legislative debate surrounding the ques-
tion of who should-make the threshold determination also reveals
that the legislature believed providing access to the courts was im-
portant. 1 ! At various times, proposed amendments to House Bill
121 were introduced which would have clearly designated that the
184. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law at 61 (cited in note 107).
185. Id (cited in note 107).
186. See note 19 and accompanying text.
187. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law at 66 (cited in note 107).
188. House Bill 431, Printer Number 2055 (January 13, 1989).
189. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law at 67 (cited in note 107). The pro-
posed preamble stated,
(a) Findings.-The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that:
(5) The major cause for escalating auto insurance rates is the high frequency of
small bodily injury claims.
(6) The establishment of an optional verbal claims threshold in conjunction
with mandatory first party benefits will eliminate up to 90% of bodily injury
liability claims resulting from minor motor vehicle accidents for those electing
the limited tort option. The threshold will serve to reduce the cost of providing
auto insurance while providing for adequate protection of injured victims.
Id.
190. Id.
191. Id at 70.
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satisfaction of the threshold is a question of law to be determined
by the judge. 192 These amendments were either rejected when ini-
tially proposed or deleted through subsequent amendments. 193
Similar to the deletion of the proposed preamble, Mr. Sloane rea-
soned that the legislature's failure to adopt the amendments is




Finally, Mr. Sloane argued that the adoption of the Michigan
threshold language evidences an intent on the part of the legisla-
ture to have that language interpreted and applied as the Michigan
courts have applied it.9s Because the Michigan courts, namely
DiFranco, have determined that the threshold question is one for
the jury, the Pennsylvania Legislature necessarily intended such a
result.
9 6
The authors agree that the purpose of this optional threshold is
to reduce constantly escalating insurance costs and to balance that
objective with the goal of permitting those who have been injured
to seek redress for their injuries through the courts. However, ob-
taining both of these goals would seem pragmatically impossible
pursuant to the position taken by Mr. Sloane in Pennsylvania's
Optional Verbal Threshold.
9 7
There are numerous reasons which require the Pennsylvania
courts to depart from the path taken by Michigan under DiFranco
and permit the judge to make the threshold determination. First, a
comparison of the Michigan No-Fault Act to the Pennsylvania
Limited Tort System reveals vast differences between the opera-
tion and the intent of the acts. The Michigan Act is a comprehen-
192. Id at 69. Senator Scanlon introduced an amendment on December 11, 1989 which
stated in part:
Definitional Section (Serious Injury) - A personal injury resulting in death, serious
impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement. The determination-
of whether an injury constitutes a serious'injury shall be a question of law and not
a question of fact.
Id (emphasis added).
Senator Loeper immediately introduced a nullifying amendment which was adopted. Id.
Subsequently, Representative Stephen Friend introduced an amendment stating:
Amend Bill page 18, line 29 by adding after the "period" The determination of
whether an injury constitutes a serious injury shall be a question of law and not a
question of fact.
Id (emphasis added). Similarly, this amendment was defeated. Id.,
193. Id at 70.
194. Id.
195. Id at 76.
196. Id.
197. Sloane, 8 Pennsylvania Auto Insurance Law at 61 (cited in note 107).
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sive compensation system which eliminates fault as a prerequisite
to recovery, statutorily structures any and all potential compensa-
tion, economic and noneconomic, and is mandatorily imposed on
all Michigan drivers. The Pennsylvania Limited Tort System, how-
ever, is an optional system with the sole purpose of precluding cer-
tain noneconomic claims. The only similarities between these acts
is their common definition of the term "serious injury."
The basis given by the DiFranco court for permitting the jury to
decide the threshold question was to effectuate the purpose of the
Michigan No-Fault system, and to ameliorate the harshness of de-
priving accident victims an opportunity to receive recovery for
noneconomic loss. The DiFranco court stated,
As to the fear that automobile negligence litigation will dramatically in-
crease, modifying this aspect of Cassidy will result in more noneconomic
loss cases going to trial. However, the pre-Cassidy case law did not require a
trial in every case. Moreover, no-fault acts were designed primarily to re-
duce the number of cases seeking damages for economic loss, e.g., wage loss,
survivor's loss, and medical expenses. Although section 3135(1) was
designed to eliminate lawsuits seeking noneconomic damages for minor inju-
ries, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended to wipe out almost all
noneconomic loss cases. The legislative history indicates that less stringent
thresholds were adopted as a concession to attorneys performing personal
injury work.
To those who argue that permitting more noneconomic loss cases to go to
trial will cripple the no-fault system, we note that limiting tort liability for
noneconomic losses is not an essential feature of no-fault acts.
198
The primary purpose of the Michigan No-fault system was deter-
mined to be the reduction of economic loss cases, rather than the
elimination of noneconomic loss cases. In fact, the reduction of the
number of noneconomic loss cases is reasoned to be of very little
importance to the Michigan No-Fault Act. In this respect the
Pennsylvania system is distinguishable. Section 1075(d) has only
one purpose or effect: to reduce the number of noneconomic loss
cases. Adoption of the DiFranco court's lack of concern over the
increase of noneconomic loss cases, therefore, would serve to
counteract the purpose of the Pennsylvania rule.199
198. DiFranco, 398 NW2d at 908.
199. In fact, permitting the jury to determine if a particular injury is serious may actu-
ally encourage litigation in Pennsylvania. The reduced premiums of the limited tort option
would encourage participation. However, after reaping the benefits of the low premiums, a
non-seriously injured party would always be free to take his case to the jury in the hope that
he might be awarded a large recovery. In such a situation, the insured has the best of both
worlds: his premiums are lower and he still has a 50/50 chance at recovering pain and suffer-
ing damages for any injury.
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Similarly, the reduction of legal costs and, in turn, insurance
premiums would not be facilitated by permitting the jury to decide
each case. This was observed in Cassidy when the court stated,
Regarding the second problem, if non-economic losses were always to be a
matter subject to adjudication under the act, the goal of reducing motor
vehicle accident litigation would likely be illusory. The combination of the
costs of continuing litigation ... could easily threaten the economic viabil-
ity, or at least the desirability of providing so many benefits without regard
to fault. If every case is subject to the potential of litigation on the question
of non-economic loss, for which recovery is still predicated on negligence,
perhaps little has been gained by granting benefits for economic loss with-
out regard to fault.
2 0 0
This rationale is also applicable to the Pennsylvania threshold: if
the non-economic loss claims were always subject to adjudication,
then absolutely nothing would be gained by implementation of sec-
tion 1705. To the contrary, it would add an additional complexity
to a traditional negligence case.
Even the express language of section 1705 dictates that the judge
make the threshold determination. Section 1705(d) states that
"each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be
precluded from maintaining an [action] for any noneconomic loss
. . ." Necessarily, to maintain an action the threshold must be sat-
isfied. Unless an action can be maintained, the jury cannot even
hear the case. The entire action is barred, not simply the
recovery.20 1
D. Proposed Resolution
The Pennsylvania Legislature clearly had the Michigan thresh-
old standard in-mind when it adopted the section 1702 definition
of serious injury. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to look to
the test that the Michigan courts apply to make threshold determi-
nations. However, it is not reasonable to conclude that our legisla-
ture would enact a law which, when applied, defeats its own pur-
pose (i.e., a rule which expressly reduces the number of potential
trials but, as applied, actually complicates simple negligence cases
and does not reduce, or only nominally reduces, such cases). Also
unreasonable is the conclusion that there would be any reduction
in legal expenses if the jury were to make the threshold determina-
200. Cassidy, 330 NW2d at 28.
201. The Michigan Act, to the contrary, states that "a person remains subject to tort
liability for noneconomic loss . . ." Mich Comp Laws § 500.3135(1973); Mich Stat Ann §
24.13135 (Callaghan 1973). This language only precludes the recovery, not the action itself.
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tions; in fact, such a rule would increase legal costs and defeat the
purpose of section 1705.
The DiFranco threshold test was simply a watered-down version
of the Cassidy test applied by the jury instead of the judge. The
authors conclude that the best and most reasonable solution for
Pennsylvania is the application of this watered-down Cassidy test
by the judge. The proposed test would require a plaintiff to estab-
lish that there is: (1) an impairment of a body function, any body
function, such that the plaintiff's ordinary or normal use of that
body function is prevented; (2) an impairment having conse-
quences on the particular plaintiff which are serious in their nature
(severity should be judged based on several factors including: the
extent of the impairment, the particular body function impaired,
the length of time the impairment lasted - or will last - the treat-
ment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant
factors); and (3) an injury of a medically identifiable nature, such
that there is a physical basis for the plaintiff's subjective com-
plaints of pain and suffering. This three-pronged determination
should be made by the judge prior to trial. If the judge determines
that these three elements are satisfied, then the plaintiff's claim
may proceed to trial with no further reference to the serious im-
pairment threshold. If the plaintiff fails to establish these ele-
ments, then his claim, so far as it relates to noneconomic damages,
should be dismissed. Such a standard would be fair and would also
accomplish the purpose of section 1705.
The judiciary's interpretation and application of the exceptions
to the limited tort system, in particular the serious injury excep-
tion, will either facilitate the success of the limited tort system and
permit the achievement of its purpose, or destine it for failure.
Michael F. Nerone
III. CONCLUSION
The 1990 auto insurance law apparently has the intended effect
of saving time and money for all parties involved. The introduction
of first party "bad faith" has the intended effect of forcing insurers
to deal with the insureds in good faith, thereby expediting the
quick resolution of valid insurance claims. Similarly, the limited
tort rule is intented to reduce the amount of auto insurance litiga-
tion, thereby saving insurers money, which savings can then be
passed on to the insureds in the form of lower premiums.
However, be aware that both of these sections are clearly subject
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to abuse if not properly interpreted and applied. Such improper
interpretation or application would paralyze the Pennsylvania auto
insurance industry. This paralysis is evidenced by several Pennsyl-
vania auto insurers' initial refusal to write any new auto insurance
policies in response to the new legislation. The analysis set forth in
this article is intented to provide a means of interpreting and ap-
plying these sections, which means will preclude potential abuses
while achieving the desired benefits of House Bill 121.
C. Christopher Hasson
Michael F. Nerone

